I define a restricted version of Nash's Independence that overcomes its major criticisms and then show that a one parameter class of asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions is characterized by Restricted Independence, Scale Invariance, Pareto Optimality and Kalai and Smorodinsky's Individual Monotonicity.
Introduction
I adopt the view that the bargaining problem is a robust representation of some non-cooperative game about which the modeler does not have full information. I show that the axioms that are most desirable from this viewpoint characterize a family of asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. Before turning to the discussion of the axioms, I will briefly introduce some notation.
2
I denote a bargaining problem by a set S # R such that 0 [ S. S is interpreted as the set of all utility profiles that a bargaining process could possibly yield, and 0 is the disagreement point. I say that S is comprehensive if y [ S whenever x [ S and x $ y $ 0. S is said to be strictly comprehensive if it is comprehensive and there exists a z [ S such that z 4 y whenever x,y [ S and x . y $ 0. The 2 convex comprehensive hull of a set S # R , cch (S) , is the smallest convex and comprehensive set 2 containing S. I denote by S the class of compact convex and comprehensive sets S # R for which 1 there is an x [ S such that x 4 0. Any function that chooses for each set S [ S an element of S is called a solution, and will usually be denoted by F. For any set S [ S, define the 'utopia point' a (S) ; maxhx : (x ,x ) [ Sj, i 5 1,2; the Pareto set P(S) ; hx [ S : y . 
IIA). For all S,T [ S, if S # T and F(T ) [ S hold, then F(S) 5 F(T ).

Pareto Optimality (PO). For all S [ S, F(S) [ P(S).
2
Symmetry (Sym). Given e : R → R defined by e((x ,x )) 5 (x ,x ), we must have F(e(S)) 5 e(F(S))
for all bargaining problems S.
Scale Invariance (SI). For all T [ S and affine s : R → R , we have that
If cooperative bargaining is about rational arbitration, IIA is a desirable axiom. (h(1,0) ,(1 / 2,1 / 2)j), we must have F(S) 5 (1 / 2,1 / 2). The 'un-fairness' of the choice dictated by IIA in this example comes from the fact that although in passing from T to S individual 2 sees his best choices disappear, and individual 1 does not, the solution is unchanged. It is possible to overcome this problem by weakening IIA in the following way.
F(T ) 5 F(S).
In contrast to IIA, Restricted IIA takes into account some features of the problems that it relates. In particular, RIIA requires that a /a , a proxy for the relative individual standings, remains constant. Consider two problems S, T such that S # T. It is easy to imagine that if the relative standings of the parties does not change (when passing from T to S) and the original choice remains available in the smaller set, they would again choose the same point. That is precisely RIIA. The requirement that a /a does not change between two sets makes the allowed variation (in the problems to be related) 2 1 small, and so one of the most common criticisms of IIA is partially overcome. Although RIIA is a new axiom, the idea of controlling for the utopia point in an IIA-type axiom is not new: Roth (1977) and Imai (1983) use RIIA with b 5 1. Also, since RIIA is weaker than IIA, it is satisfied by the Nash solution. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) argued that in any two problems S and T such that S # T, a (T ) 5 a (S) and a (T ) $ a (S), player j has good reason to demand that he gets more in problem T i i j j than he gets in S. They noted that Nash's solution fails to satisfy:
Their result is that the unique solution that satisfies SI, Sym, PO and IM is
While KS does not satisfy IIA, it does satisfy RIIA. Thus, IM and RIIA are compatible.
1 Although Nash (1950) justified IIA for the case where the solution was interpreted as the outcome of a bargaining process, he said that the interpretation of the axiom was ''more complicated'' than that of the others he used. Harsanyi and Selten (1972) relaxed Symmetry from the set of axioms that leads to the Nash solution and, adding Strong Individual Rationality, found a one parameter class of asymmetric Nash solutions. Since then, some objections to Symmetry (Sym) have been raised. In particular, from the viewpoint of this paper, Sym is a problematic axiom. In this setting, several features of the original situation may not be modeled in the problem. Imposing Sym can then mean, for example, assuming 2 equality of bargaining skill between the parties (Harsanyi, 1977) . Hence, if in a bargaining situation within a family it is the case that the man and the woman do not have the same bargaining power, assuming Sym is unreasonable. Since, in fact, predictions based on symmetric solutions disagree with the empirical evidence on bargaining problems within families, Dasgupta (1993, p. 342 ) argues against Sym. Thus, allowing for asymmetric solutions makes the theory more flexible.
Given the above discussion, in the remainder of the paper I will analyze the compatibility of Restricted Independence and Individual Monotonicity without assuming Symmetry. Also, I will take Pareto Optimality and Scale Invariance for granted. I will show that the one parameter family of Asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, and only that family, satisfies these axioms. The result is relevant, not only because it uses those axioms that are most desirable from the positive viewpoint, but because it characterizes a one parameter family of solutions. Within the class of asymmetric solutions, one parameter families of solutions are important for at least two reasons. First, if it is known both that a solution belongs to a one parameter family and what the outcome dictated by the solution is in a certain problem, it is likely that the solution can be identified. Put differently, it is likely that the outcome in any other problem can be computed. This condition is not satisfied by large families of solutions: it may well be the case that a continuum of solutions within a large family would yield a given outcome. If this is the case, knowing the outcome in a problem is not very informative about the outcomes in other problems. Second, when a bargaining problem is just one stage of a complicated model, an easy-to-compute solution is needed. A one parameter class of solutions is likely to be simple.
As by-products of this work I get a new characterization of the KS solution that does not rely on Symmetry. That is, I recover that property from seemingly unrelated axioms.
The asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution KS l
I now define a new asymmetric one parameter function that generalizes the KS solution in a natural 2 way. For notational simplicity, let hx [ R : x 5`x j denote the y-axis throughout. Then, for Thomson (1994) calls the weighted KS solution by
The KS solution is nested within hD : l [ R < h`jj: D 5 KS. However, for l ± 1 the solution D is Relaxing Sym from the KS set of axioms is not enough to characterize this family, however, since 4 this leads to the class of individually monotonic solutions. There are two problems with this class. First, there are too many individually monotonic solutions: given F(S) for any S [ S, there are more than continuum many individually monotonic solutions that would yield F(S) as an outcome. Second, and most importantly, most of the solutions within the class do not satisfy RIIA.
The main result of this paper is the following characterization of KS , which uses a tight set of l axioms.
Theorem 1. A solution F satisfies SI, IM, PO, and RIIA on S if and only if there exists a unique
as (T )a(X) and X is contained in U, RIIA implies that F(X) 5 D (T ). Applying IM twice I get l l
F(T ) $ D (T ). Then, PO yields F(T ) 5 KS (T ), and by SI, F(S) 5 KS (S). h l l l
I have managed to preserve desirable axioms like IM, PO and SI, and by adding a version of IIA that overcomes its major criticisms, I get a simple, one parameter asymmetric KS solution. Note that 
